HERMENEUTICS

Part : Analytic Philosophy

Lecturer:
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I. Analytic Philosophy

A. Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein I

- Russell's Logical Atomism
- First Wittgenstein's Picture Theory
- Logical Positivism as the consequence

## B. Wittgenstein II – Language Game Theory

C. John R. Searle's Speech Act Theory

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Analytic Philosophy

Problem :

**The appearance of many problems
and disputation in relation to human knowledge**

Cause

the unclear use of expressions.

Solution

a precise investigation
on "what the exact
issue/point in question is"

**Therefore, the most important for analytic philosopher
is to use a clear proposition, and to investigate propositions
by analysis of statements**

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G. Moore :
It appears to me in that in Etics,
as in all philosophical studies,
the difficulties and disagreements,
…are mainly due to a very simple cause,
namely that :

to attempt to answer questions,
WITHOUT FIRST DISCOVERIES
WHAT QUESTION IT IS
which you desire to answer
(Principia Ethica, 1966)

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Text ⟷ **Interpretation**

(basic element)   (basic element)

Word/ proper name ⟷ **Meaning**

difficulties & disagreements in discourses

Cause

AMBIGUITY of meaning in the used language/ proposition

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Solution

Just practicing Analytical method on ordinary language with focus to its clarity — **Moore**

Russell

Aspire to built a Perfect language

Wittgenstein

Limiting the use of ordinary language

RUSSEL & WITGENSTEIN 1st

Perfect Language & Picture Theory

RUSSEL

Ambiguity

It is because of the **characteristics of ordinary language**

Solution

Aspiring to BUILT NEW language instead.

A PERFECT LANGUAGE

Logical language formulated in *Principia mathematica*

➡ No ambiguity in reference

➡ Has real-external connotations

➡ Universally applicable

Hence, It **REFLECTS REALITY** Clearly that can be used uniformly by all people **without falls into ambiguity**

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RUSSEL

**ORDINARY LANGUAGE**

PERFECT LANGUAGE
Logical language

PROPER NAME

Ordinary Proper Name

Near to
description of attributes

Logical Proper Name

Relates just to
reference (named object),
not attributes

MEANING is REFERRENCE

One proper name for one meaning,
refer to one external real object
or simple object (*atomical fact*)

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WITTGENSTEIN 1st

statement

elementary proposition

elementary proposition

names

name

e.p.

name

name

STATEMENT

Consists of

1/more ELEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS

Consist of

NAMES

1 NAME → 1 real *state of affair*

Wittgenstein 1 is parallel to Russell

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elements of proposition = elements of reality

So, meaning is reference

Language is the **picture** of reality

It has **correspondence** function

CRITERION OF PERFECT LANGUAGE?

- If the meaning of a proper name is real reference
- So proper name must refer to a real object

To assure (that it has real reference)

by **VERIFICATION**
(empirical observation)

It means proper name must be verifiable

Problem

- Empirical observation just deals with sensible object / phenomena

- So the reference must be sensible or empirical

Conclusion

the criterion whether a proposition has meaning or not is

Sensibility of its reference

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Sensibility of its reference

Problem

- God (subject of theology),
- existence (subject of metaphysics),
- good, evil (subject of ethics)

Unverifiable

consequence

Propositions on theology, metaphysics, ethics are

MEANINGLESS

(Logical Positivism)

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CRITICS

MEANING is REFERRENCE

All words / proper name that have sensible reference is meaningful

All words that have no sensible reference is meaningless

Their claims are

MEANINGLESS

Both basic proposition are SELF-REFERRENCE, HAS NO (SENSIBLE) REFERRENCE

WITTGENSTEIN 2

Language Game

- The function of **correspondence (**like a picture)
  is just **part of the function of language**

Consider this examples :

"I promise", "I am sory," thanks", "amin," "give me that book,"

- These use of expressions **don't correspond to, and aren't description of, external object and are not reflection of any sensible reference.**

- Those are action by speaking, not describing outside phenomenon but the speaking is the phenomenon, the action, the reference itself.

- So this form language has its own rule of language

- In fact, there are many **various use of language.**

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In real communication, **where do we get any meaning ?**

- We have meaning from our
  FORM OF LIFE

Different form of life → Different context

→ Different usage of language →different meaning

So meaning is **contextual**. It depends upon in what **form of life it is used.**

MEANING IS USE

NO meaning
BEFORE or AFTER use.

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Traditional notion

MEANING

Word :

P – E - N

Real Referrence :

Russel & wittgenstein I

Word :

P – E - N

Real Referrence :

wittgenstein II

Word :

P – E - N

Form of life 1 / Meaning 1

F o L 2 / M 2

F o L 3 / M 3

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Problem I

if meaning is functioned according to form of life

while every individual human has its own personal form of life

There is no common form of life

There will be no agreement/ commonness in meaning.

There is no possibility in communication

Problem

In fact, people are able to communicate their notion to others, it is impossible if there is no commonness in meaning.

Meaning (M) = Form of Life (FoL)

FoL (1) ≠ FoL (2)

M (1) ≠ M (2)

**Meaning is Use is incorrect**

Therefore, there must be common meaning

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2nd Wittgenstein's answer

- beside we have particular form of life, we have also common form of life.
- Therefore, beside we have personal meaning of a word which is different one another, we have also common meaning of it.
- The common form of life is the common meaning

Communication is possible just in this domain

It means :
everyone can have meaning of a name / word in 2 distinguish parts:
1. part of personal meaning that others doesn't have
2. part of common meaning that others could have

Personal
FoL (1)
=
m (1)

Common
FoL (1~2)
=
m (1 ~ 2)

Personal
FoL (2)
=
m (2)

FoL (1)

FoL (2)

"G O D"

1

2

Meaning for 1

70 %
30 %

Common meaning
=

70 %
30 %

Meaning for 2

≠
Personal meaning

1

2

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FoL (**Form** of Life) = context of use of lAanguage = meaning (M)

Meaning is Use

1. Wittgenstein's response seems to assume that

> **meaning is like material, i.e. composite, whereas meaning is simple.**

2. If meaning is use = context / form of life, and every person has his different form of life, while meaning is simple, it will seem that :

FoL (1) ≠ FoL (2)

Meaning in (1) ≠ Meaning in (2)

Meaning for 1   Meaning for 2

70 %   common   70 %
30 %   =   30 %

≠
personal

X

FoL (1)   M 1 (water is A)   ≠   M 2 (water is B)   FoL (2)

"W-A-T-e-R"

"G-o-D"

1   2

√

Word (1) = word (2)

> **commonness only possible occurs not in the meaning but in the word**

16   because it is used together both by the speaker or listener in the act of communication

Meaning is Use

no meaning before or after context.

Problem 2

John Searle's criticism

- When we say or use a word to express a meaning in a given context, the meaning doesn't come suddenly by the time we speak/use it.

- In a conversation, for example, the act of communication involves some steps:

  I. Meaning → we must know (the meaning of) a name / word beforehand,

  II. Act → then use it in expression in a certain context,

  III. Then the hearer knows the meaning of the word we use

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I

II

Where is my PEN??

III

- **Without firstly knowing the meaning, how can we decide to choose that some certain word, and not the others, are the correct words to use in a given context?**

- It is because we previously know the meaning before use it, then we know and can determine the correct word to use.

if there is meaning before use

So, MEANING IS NOT USE.

Karl Popper criticism to analytic philosophers

- Analytic philosopher aimed to obtain a true knowledge by focusing to the use of language, because many faulty in philosophy come from the unclearness and carelessness in language.
- Various ways are posed by analytic philosopher, such as :
    - developed a perfect language (Russell)
    - practicing analyze method to ordinary language   (Moore)
    - limiting the use of ordinary language (Wittgenstein)

KARL POPPER

He said that analytic philosopher are just like those who **never stop cleaning their eye-glasses, but never use it to see** the reality.

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After Karl Popper

- Some circles of analytic philosophy arisen,

- They have no intention to make one universal and perfect language to whole kind of use and context.

- They focused their analytical method in ordinary use of language,

> Circle 1 : John Austin, Searle, Gilbert Ryle,
>
> Circle II : Quine's philosophical stream
>
> Circle III : Kripke (after 1960 / '70 era)